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Abstract
We present an empirical framework for
testing negotiation strategies in a com-
plex win–lose game that lacks any ana-
lytic solution. We explore how different
belief and memory models affect trading
and win rates. We show that cognitive lim-
itations can be compensated for by being
an ‘optimistic’ negotiator: make your de-
sired trade offer, regardless of your be-
liefs about how opponents will react. In
contrast, agents with good cognitive abili-
ties can win with fewer but more effective
offers. Corpus analysis shows human ne-
gotiators are somewhere in between, sug-
gesting that they compensate for deficient
memory and belief when necessary.
1 Introduction
Strategic negotiation is a type of non-cooperative
conversation, which the Gricean view of cogni-
tive agents fails to account for (Asher and Las-
carides, 2013). In this paper we investigate ne-
gotiation dialogues as they occur during trading,
within the example domain of the board game The
Settlers of Catan (or Settlers, Teuber, 1995; see
www.catan.com. We explore how human er-
rors in beliefs, in particular forgetting, impact ne-
gotiating and trading behaviour, and take first steps
towards building negotiation strategies that are ef-
fective in spite of deficiencies in beliefs.
Trading and bargaining is often modelled as ra-
tional actions between agents, all of whom max-
imise their expected utilities—an optimal trade-off
between what they prefer (typically defined by a
utility function) and what they believe they can
achieve (typically defined via a dynamic Bayesian
network; Savage, 1954). Solving a game problem
involves finding equilibrium strategies: an opti-
mal action for each player in that it maximises
his expected utility, assuming that the other play-
ers perform their specified action (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2009). But this Savagean model
of decision making is highly idealised and hu-
mans often deviate from it (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979; Ariely, 2008; Yong and Xinlin, 2012).
Non-optimal human behaviour occurs in complex
games, for instance, where existing algorithms
for computing expected utilities can also break
down. Settlers is one such game. It involves play-
ers conversing to negotiate trades over restricted
resources. And even if an analytic solution for
trading in Settlers were to exist, it doesn’t neces-
sarily match what humans do.
One response to this is to develop a sym-
bolic model consisting of heuristics that match
the strategies of expert human players (Thomas,
2003). But their effectiveness and correlation to
human behaviour must be evaluated. Accordingly,
we present here an empirical framework for de-
vising and evaluating heuristics. We focus on test-
ing agents with various cognitive limitations (e.g.,
memory loss), and we show that limited cognitive
abilities can be compensated for by being an op-
timistic negotiator: make an offer for your most
desired trade whatever your beliefs about its out-
come. We then compare various computational
agents with a corpus of humans playing Settlers
(Afantenos et al., 2012).
2 The Settlers of Catan
Settlers is a win–lose board game for 2 to 4 play-
ers. Each player acquires resources (ore, wood,
wheat, clay, sheep) and uses them in different
combinations to build roads, settlements and cities
on a board like the one shown in Figure 1. This
earns points and the first player with 10 points
wins. Players acquire resources in several ways,
e.g., via the dice roll that starts each turn and
through trading with other players—so players
converse to negotiate trades. The dice rolls make
Figure 1: A game of Settlers in JSettlers.
future states non-deterministic, compelling play-
ers to assess the risk of their moves, including
trading moves. A player’s decisions about what
resources to trade depends on what he wants to
build; e.g., a road requires 1 clay and 1 wood.
Trading decisions are also determined by esti-
mates of what will most advance, or undermine,
the opponents’ strategies (Thomas, 2003). Players
can also lose resources: e.g., a player who rolls a
7 can rob from another player. What’s robbed is
hidden from view, so players lack complete infor-
mation about their opponents’ resources. Because
Settlers is a game of imperfect information, agents
can, and frequently do, engage in ‘futile’ negoti-
ations, which don’t result in any trade. An agent
that initiates a negotiation that doesn’t result in a
trade has in effect miscalculated the equilibrium
strategies.
3 Related Work
There are several empirical approaches to mod-
elling Settlers, but none of them includes trad-
ing or negotiation. Szita et al. (2010) and Roelofs
(2012) use Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), but
on a simplified version of Settlers without any ne-
gotiation and trading between players. In contrast,
our focus is on negotiation strategies and their in-
teraction with cognitive ability.
Pfeiffer (2003) uses reinforcement learning to
acquire Settlers strategies from game simulations.
The results show that a mixture of hand-coded
heuristics and learnt strategies challenges human
players. This is encouraging, but it is unclear
whether the heuristics are cognitively plausible or
yield successful trading strategies. We address this
here by evaluating different trading heuristics in
a simulated game environment and comparing the
results with what people do.
Related work on imperfect information games,
such as poker and Settlers, emphasises the im-
portance of modelling beliefs (Sweeney, 2012).
An agent’s beliefs about his opponents’ intentions
is known as opponent modelling or nested be-
liefs (Rieser et al., 2012). Vogel et al. (2013) have
shown that nested beliefs are useful for reasoning
about implicature-rich interpretations in dialogue.
So the following experiments evaluate how the
capacity to accurately model nested beliefs con-
tributes to negotiating, trading and winning.
4 Planning in JSettlers
We use an open source implementation called
JSettlers (jsettlers2.sourceforge.net,
Thomas, 2003). JSettlers is a client–server system:
a server maintains the game state and passes mes-
sages between each of the players’ clients, which
can run on different computers. Clients can be hu-
man players or computer agents. Here, we report
on simulations between computer agents.
The JSettlers agent, which we call the original
agent, goes through multiple phases after the dice
roll that starts its turn:
1. Deal with game events: e.g. placing the rob-
ber; acquiring or discarding resources.
2. Determine legal and potential places to build.
3. Estimate the time required to build pieces on
legal places (the ETB).
4. Compute the Best Build Plan (BBP): a se-
quence of build actions that achieves 10
points in the shortest estimated time (ignor-
ing how opponents might hinder your plans).
5. Try to execute the BBP, including negotiat-
ing and trading with other players and/or the
bank or a port.
As we are exploring how various cognitive lim-
itations impact decisions to negotiate and how that
affects trading and winning, all our agents adopt
the same build strategy: i.e., steps 1–4 remain con-
stant, while step 5 differs across agents. We first
describe these common steps.
Agents sort resources into needed vs. not
needed given their BBP. When considering
whether to offer an unneeded resource for a
needed one (and likewise when considering
whether to accept an offer addressed to them), an
agent compares the Estimated Build Time (ETB)
of the offer against that of its Best Alternative to
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), the latter being
no trade at all, a bank trade (at a 4:1 ratio) or a
port trade (at a 3:1 or 2:1 ratio, depending on the
port). All our agents make the offer only if the for-
mer ETB is shorter than the latter.
Sufficient conditions for making an offer differ
among our agents, however. By using the same
ETBs and build policies, all our agents have the
same ‘instrinsic’ trading preferences, but differ in
extrinsic preferences because of different beliefs
about the offer’s outcome. Their differing beliefs
stem from their different cognitive capacities (how
much evidence they have for predicting an offer’s
outcome), and their different ways of handling
missing evidence (see Section 5 for details).
Agents have three possible responses to a trade
offer during a negotiation: to accept it (and enact
the trade), to counteroffer (which may be a com-
pletion of a partial offer) or to reject it. An agent
accepts an offer if the offer is executable and its
ETB is less than that of its BATNA; he counterof-
fers if the offer’s ETB is not less than that of its
BATNA but there is an offer that he hasn’t already
made that satisfies the agent’s sufficient conditions
for offering; otherwise he rejects the offer.
5 Negotiation Strategies
To win, an agent needs an effective trading strat-
egy and an effective negotiation strategy. An ef-
fective trading strategy is one that increases the
player’s likelihood of winning: i.e., on average,
his choices of when and what to trade help him
more than they hurt him. An effective negotia-
tion strategy increases the likelihood that negotia-
tions culminate in an effective trade. Our initial ex-
periments demonstrate that the implemented JSet-
tlers trading strategy is effective (see Sections 6.2
and 6.3). So in order to evaluate distinct negoti-
ation policies and belief models with appropriate
controls, we make all agents adopt the same effec-
tive JSettlers trading choices.
A trade offer has a non-deterministic outcome
because it depends on the opponents reaction: a
desired outcome is that the offer is accepted (so
the trade is enacted) but without that trade help-
ing the opponent more than it helps the proposer.
Here, this means that the opponent has fewer than
8 points and his BBP doesnt block the proposers
own BBP. Thus agents should use evidence, both
past and present, to estimate the opponents (hid-
den) resources and BBP, to infer whether an offer
will have this desired outcome.
In this paper, we manipulate the cognitive ca-
pacity of an agent via how much evidence he has
for predicting an outcome; and we manipulate how
optimistic or pessimistic he is about an outcome
when evidence is inconclusive. So overall, we ma-
nipulate what evidence an agent uses, and how he
uses it. In total we investigate 10 conditions, see
table 1.
On cognitive capacity, we investigate at one
extreme agents who are omniscient about the op-
ponents’ resources and/or BBPs (making the game
state fully observable), and at the other extreme
agents who lack any evidence at all (either past
or present) for inferring them. Within these two
extremes, we implement agents who use past and
present evidence to estimate the opponents’ re-
sources and BBPs, but they forget past evidence
after a certain time. We give the details in Sec-
tion 6.
We then distinguish three ways of using evi-
dence to predict the outcomes of dialogue moves.
An optimistic proposer makes a trade offer with
the best possible ETB regardless of the evidence
for its outcome; thus, he in effect ignores evidence
that’s against the desired outcome even when it ex-
ists!
Alternatively one can be less optimistic, mak-
ing a trade offer only if the available evidence
yields a belief in its desired outcome. In fact, we
implement two non-optimistic agents, which han-
dle missing evidence differently. The original JSet-
tlers agent is what we call a cautious proposer:
he makes an offer only if he believes it will have
the desired outcome, but he defaults to this belief
when the evidence is inconclusive. That is, when
he has insufficient evidence to infer certain infor-
mation about his opponents’ resources and BBPs,
he simply assumes favourable values.
This contrasts with a pessimistic proposer who
makes a trade offer only if he believes it will
have the desired outcome, but unlike the cautious
proposer he defaults to believing it won’t in the
absence of information to the contrary. Thus, by
default the pessimist assumes the trading partner
does not have his desired resource or is not will-
ing to sell it or does not need what the pessimist is
offering.
Finally, we implement agents who issue partial
offers like (1a), as opposed to only making com-
plete offers like (1b):
(1) a. I need clay.
b. Max, will you give me 1 clay for 1 wood?
The original JSettlers agent only makes complete
offers like (1b), but this isn’t human-like (see Sec-
tion 6.8 for details): only 4.7% of the offers in the
corpus we collected of people playing Settlers are
as specific as (1b); 23.1% specify the resources but
not their quantity; and the most frequent type of
offer, at 34.8%, is a partial offer specifying the re-
ceivable resource, as in (1a).
In addition to partial offers, we evaluate dif-
ferent proposer-types (optimistic, cautious, pes-
simistic) with different cognitive abilities (omni-
scient, ignorant, forgetful) in terms of their effec-
tiveness as negotiators and their chances of win-
ning. We started with Thomas’ (2003) original
JSettlers agent. We modified the code slightly,
e.g., by improving the initial placement of pieces
and fixing a number of bugs that, for example, af-
fected the automated running of large numbers of
games in our simulations. However, the main plan-
ning and trading mechanisms are unchanged, and
this agent remains a cautious proposer.
This original agent is neither omniscient nor ig-
norant, but he’s not human-like: He has a perfect
memory, never forgetting past evidence, and so
maintains a perfect model of the opponents’ re-
sources until a 7 is rolled. At this point, the robbed
player loses a resource to the robbing player, and
any player with 7 or more resources must discard
half of them. Which resources a player loses is
unobservable to agents not involved in the trans-
fer, and so the JSettlers agent downdates his be-
liefs for all resources of the affected player to un-
known. This extreme form of belief change is also
not human-like, as humans would still keep an
hypothesis of potential resources owned by this
player. Here, we investigate how human mem-
ory, in particular forgetting, influences the effec-
tiveness of various distinct negotiation strategies,
showing that some of these penalise a player with
deficient beliefs while others do not. We thus make
the first steps towards building negotiation strate-
gies that are effective in spite of human-like errors
in beliefs. In future work, we will also investigate
how more elaborate forms of belief update and re-
vision (after unobservable events) will influence
negotiation strategies.
The original agent is not strong but is at least
in the ballpark of human performance. Thomas
(2003) performed an evaluation where in each
game three agents (agents without our bug fixes
and improvements) played one human player. The
human player won about 50% of the games (and
each agent about 17%).
6 Experiments with Modified Agents
6.1 Method
Simulations for testing a particular belief model
and strategy for proposing trades all consist of 1
modified agent playing 3 original agents in 10,000
games. So the null hypothesis is that each agent
wins 25% of these 10,000 games. To carry out
these simulations, we created a simulation envi-
ronment for JSettlers. The server and the 4 agents
all ran on the same machine, and a simulation
of 10,000 games took about 0.5–1h on a desktop
computer.
In addition to measuring the win rate, we anal-
yse the agents’ negotiating and trading behaviour:
the number of offers they made, the total number
of successful offers (i.e., how many trade offers
resulted in a trade), and the total number of trades
with other players, i.e. including trades resulting
from accepting other players’ offers. Finally, the
proportion of an agent’s offers that are successful
gives a rough measure of how accurately he esti-
mates an equilibrium trading move. Table 1 gives
an overview of the results.
Due to the large number of games in each sim-
ulation even small differences can be significant
(as long as the standard deviation is also reduced).
At the same time, in the simulations reported here
there are no significant differences between the
three instances of the original agent, i.e. all differ-
ences result from agent modifications. For the sim-
ulations, we test significance of win rates against
the null hypothesis (25%) by using the z-test; we
analyse differences in trading behaviour among
opponents via paired t-tests for all combinations of
opponents (in fact, there were no significant differ-
ences for the offering/trading measures between
any two original opponents); and we use a signifi-
cance threshold of p < 0.01. We now describe the
simulations in detail, in the order in which they are
given in Table 1.
modified agent averages for the 3 original agents
win 
rate
offers success-
ful offers
total 
trades
successful 
offers/
offers
win 
rate
offers success-
ful offers
total 
trades
successful 
offers/
offers
random BBP
non trading
omniscient · resource
omniscient · BBP
omniscient · BBP/resource
ignorant · cautious
ignorant · pessimist
ignorant · optimist
ignorant · caut. 65% cap
partialising initially
0.022 21.9 5.1 9.0 0.23 0.326 14.2 3.9 8.1 0.27
0.127 0.0 0.0 0.0 --- 0.291 17.7 3.1 6.2 0.18
0.244 7.5 3.7 7.5 0.50 0.252 13.6 3.8 7.6 0.28
0.243 13.8 3.6 7.6 0.26 0.252 13.7 3.8 7.6 0.28
0.243 7.3 3.5 7.5 0.48 0.252 13.8 3.9 7.5 0.28
0.241 28.5 3.6 7.7 0.13 0.253 13.9 3.9 7.7 0.28
0.162 0.0 0.0 4.2 --- 0.279 14.7 4.2 7.0 0.28
0.255 27.1 3.7 7.8 0.14 0.249 13.8 3.9 7.6 0.28
0.203 12.7 1.9 6.1 0.15 0.266 14.2 4.0 7.3 0.29
0.240 19.4 2.7 7.9 0.14 0.253 14.7 4.2 7.7 0.29
Table 1: Results of 1 modified agent playing 3 original agents. Results for the modified agents are shown
in the left half; the corresponding averages of the results for the 3 original agents are shown in the right
half. Significant results (p < 0.01) are in bold.
6.2 Quality of Build Strategy
An agent’s trading and negotiation strategies are
based on a best build plan (see step 4 in the agent’s
planning procedure, Section 4). In order to es-
tablish whether we can retain the original agent’s
build plan for our experiments, we evaluate its
quality by testing it against a random BBP agent,
who chooses his ‘best’ build plan randomly.
Results and Discussion. This agent wins only
2.2% of the games, even though he makes more
trade offers, more successful offers and more
trades (using the same negotiation and trade strat-
egy as the original agent). So the original agent’s
build strategy is an improvement over a random
baseline. Together with the evaluation in Thomas
(2003), we can therefore assume that all of our
agents, which retain the JSettlers build strategy,
have decent build plans.
6.3 Benefits of Trading
To establish that trading contributes to winning,
we created the non-trading agent, which is like
the original agent except that he never trades with
other players but only with the bank or a port.
Results and Discussion. The non-trading agent
wins only half as many games as his opponents,
providing strong evidence that the JSettlers trad-
ing policy is effective and contributes to winning.
(The agent makes more trades with the bank and
ports (9.6) than his original opponents (4.9), but
this does not compensate for not trading with
agents.) So the agent’s preferences over possible
trades, defined by his ETBs and BBP, correlates
with his chances to win. Since we never change
these calculations, any changes to win rates will
stem from how effective the negotiation strategy
is in achieving a trade.
6.4 Beliefs: Omniscience
To explore how useful accurate beliefs about the
opponents’ resources are, we tested a resource
omniscient agent, who directly observes his op-
ponents’ resources but remains a cautious pro-
poser. So he never has defeasible beliefs about re-
sources, but may default to a belief that his oppo-
nent has a favourable BBP. We make the resources
observable by getting the (original) opponents to
declare them at the start of each turn (note that we
don’t allow deception in our simulations; the role
of deception in Settlers is future work). Moves that
declare resources, or lack of them, are attested fre-
quently in the human Settlers corpus (Afantenos
et al., 2012), generally via responses to questions
about offers; e.g., I’ve got clay in response to What
will you give me?, or I don’t have any in response
to I need wood.
We also tested a BBP-omniscient agent: again
a cautious proposer but one for whom his oppo-
nents’ BBPs are always observable. Again, these
are observable because agents declare them (I in-
tend to build a road.). These are attested but rare
in the Settlers corpus.
Finally, we test an agent that is omniscient on
both BBPs and resources.
Results and Discussion. None of these three
agents have significantly different win rates than
their original opponents. However, they all have a
more effective negotiating strategy, with a higher
proportion of their offers being successful. But
the resource-omniscient agents make far fewer of-
fers overall, and the BBP-omniscient agent makes
slightly but significantly fewer successful trade of-
fers.
With respect to human games, entering fewer
‘futile’ negotiations is relevant because human
players can easily get annoyed when players make
many trade offers, and in particular offers where it
is obvious that it won’t be accepted.
It may seem counterintuitive that making hid-
den parts of the Settlers game state observable
fails to improve the win rate. We believe that
this happens for three reasons. First, the original
agent’s perfect memory gives him good resource-
tracking capabilities: the only relative advantage
of the resource-omniscient agent comes after a 7
has been rolled.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, all
of our agents, both modified and original, are
only willing to negotiate for their best possible
trade, and do not consider entering a negotiation
for a ‘second best’ possibility should they be-
lieve that their best possible trade isn’t achiev-
able. This aspect of the negotiation strategy hurts
the omniscient agent: since he never defaults to
favourable values, he starts a negotiation less fre-
quently than an original agent would (in our simu-
lations, around half the time). This denies the om-
niscient agents the chance to consider counterof-
fers that may not be best but are nevertheless ef-
fective and so acceptable. But the non-omniscient
agent gets relatively more opportunities to con-
sider such counteroffers. In future work, we plan
to investigate how adapting the negotiation strat-
egy to allow initiating a negotiation for a ‘second
best’ build plan would enhance the win rates.
Finally, making declarations of BBPs seems to
be largely redundant: all agents use the same eval-
uation function for computing everyone’s BBPs,
and for the opponents’ BBPs this function draws
only on the observable part of the game state
and beliefs about the opponents’ (hidden) re-
sources, which even for the original agent are rel-
atively accurate. This redundancy also explains
why the BBP/resource-omniscient agent per-
forms to much the same level as the resource om-
niscient agent. In future work, we plan to investi-
gate how declaring build plans when agents have
distinct build policies—as humans players invari-
ably do—impacts game performance.
6.5 Beliefs: Ignorant
The ignorant agent does not track the other
agents’ resources at all. He can deal with this lack
of knowledge in 3 ways: being optimistic (as-
sume all opponents have all resources), being cau-
tious (treat all opponents’ resources as unknown
but track the overall amount, and default to assum-
ing they have the desired resource if this doesn’t
conflict with knowledge of how many resources
they have) or being pessimistic (assume all oppo-
nents have no resources). So the pessimistic agent
never makes an initial offer (because he believes
that the offer will be rejected) but may accept of-
fers from others. In contrast, the optimistic and
cautious agents make many offers.
Results and Discussion. The ignorant pessimist
wins significantly fewer games and makes fewer
trades (and no trade offers, by design). In contrast,
the cautious and optimistic proposers can compen-
sate for the deficient belief model by making twice
as many trade offers. Thus, while it pays to have
a relatively accurate belief model and to reason
about likely outcomes of offers, there are also ne-
gotiation strategies that compensate for a deficient
belief model, which involve ignoring the risk of
your desired offer having an undesired outcome,
i.e. not being accepted.
Capping the number of trade offers. Because
the optimistic and cautious proposers compensate
for ignorance by making many trade offers, we
tested whether the driving factor is the quantity or
the quality of the offers, by capping the number
of offers the cautious ignorant agent can make to
the same level as his original opponents. We im-
plemented this by letting the ignorant agent make
the decision on whether to make a trade offer but
then only ‘allowed’ it to actually go through with
making it 65% of the time. As can be seen in Ta-
ble 1, this agent fares much worse than the equiva-
lent ‘non-capped’ ignorant agent, showing that he
is able to approach the winning rates of his less
belief-deficient opponents only by counteracting
the lower quality in his trade offers by increasing
their quantity. Note also that in this simulation, the
original opponents make fewer trades because the
ignorant capped agent makes fewer acceptable of-
fers.
6.6 Negotiation Strategy: Partial Offers
As mentioned before, a major difference between
the way the JSettlers agents and human players
negotiate is that people often make partial offers
like example (1a). People typically do not make
a complete trade offer immediately, but incremen-
tally negotiate towards a more specific, and mutu-
ally acceptable, offer.
For this reason, we tested a partialising agent
that initially computes a complete trade offer but
then partialises it to only specify the resources it
wants—i.e., it starts a negotiation with (1a), as op-
posed to (1b). It then reverts back to the original
negotiation strategy. In this way, we test how our
agents fare when adopting a human-like initial of-
fering strategy.
Results and Discussion. Making an initial par-
tial offer does not affect the agent’s chances of
winning and results in a small but significant in-
crease in the number of trades it makes. But this
agent does make many more trade offers than the
original agents of which fewer are successful. The
latter is due to the fact that agents cannot accept
partial offers: typically, the complete offer that
complements the initial partial offer was made by
one of the original agents.
6.7 Memory: Forgetting Beliefs
The original agent and our modified agents so far
do not have a realistic model of human mem-
ory: they do not forget any observed informa-
tion. Therefore, we made the agent forget his be-
liefs about his opponents’ resources after a cer-
tain time. For example, if the agent did not re-
ceive any new evidence about player-2’s clay re-
sources, the belief was set to 0 for the forgetting
pessimist proposer and to 2 for the forgetting
cautious proposer (so the cautious proposer as-
sumes a favourable value in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary). In future work we will re-
place this by a more realistic and cognitively ade-
quate memory model.
Because the JSettlers system does not maintain
a global time, we used the number of messages
sent by the JSettlers game server to approximate
passing time. In a typical game, the server sends
between 3500 and 5500 messages. We varied the
time after which an agent forgets a belief from 5
to 1000. Note that ignorant agents are agents with
a forgetting latency of 0.
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Figure 2: Win rates and number of offers over the
latency before information is forgotten.
Results and Discussion. Figure 2 shows how
the win rate and the number of trade offers
changes with the time an agent can remember his
beliefs. The cautious forgetting agent can, once
more, compensate his lack of knowledge by as-
suming a desired outcome will occur in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary. And while the
number of successful offers and total trades is con-
stant for the cautious proposer and is the same as
that of the original agent, the more forgetful he is,
the more he makes unsuccessful trades offers and
his negotiations become less effective.
The pessimistic forgetting agent makes fewer
trade offers and wins fewer games the more for-
getful he is. Only with a considerable ability to re-
member information (i.e. only if he forgets infor-
mation after about 500 to 1000 time steps, which
is already a considerable part of the entire game)
does his performance approach that of the original
agent.
Thus, only if a forgetful agent adopts favourable
offers success-
ful offers
total 
trades
TIO trades match-
ing TIO
trades not match-
ing TIO
successful offers/
offers
original
ignorant · cautious
omniscient • BP/resource
partialising initially
forgetting pessimist 200
Novice Corpus
13.5 3.8 7.6 6.5 2.5 1.1 0.28
30.6 3.8 7.6 10.2 1.8 1.9 0.12
13.7 3.8 7.7 6.5 2.6 1.1 0.28
22.8 3.8 7.5 6.6 2.6 3.6 0.17
6.7 2.8 5.6 4.0 2.1 0.6 0.42
21.5 2.6 5.2 10.4 1.9 1.4 0.12
Table 2: Results of 4 agents of the same type, and the corpus of novice players. TIO are turn-initial offers.
beliefs in the absence of actual information, can he
compensate for his deficient memory.
6.8 A Comparison with Human Data
We now compare the simulated behaviour against
the negotiating and trading behaviour of people
playing Settlers. Our human data, shown in the last
row of Table 2, is taken from an annotated corpus
of humans playing Settlers, where detailed infor-
mation about bargaining moves (offers, counterof-
fers, acceptance, rejection, etc.) and associated in-
formation about giveable and receivable resources
that offers express are recorded (Afantenos et al.,
2012).
As a first step, we used the annotated data from
7 games, where all players were new to the game,
i.e. had not played Settlers before participating in
the study. In future work, we will also compare
the performance against players with varying de-
grees of expertise. As all players in the current set
of games are members of a homogeneous popula-
tion (novice Settlers players) we ran simulations
where 4 agents of the same type play against each
other. We only did this for the agents that are most
interesting for a comparison (see Table 2).
Results and Discussion. The results from the
simulations and the corpus given in Table 2 show
that there is not one single agent from those we
have investigated so far that exhibits the same be-
haviour as the novice players on all factors. The
number of human trade offers is closest to the
agent that initially partialises his trade offers; the
successful trade offers and total trades are simi-
lar to the forgetting pessimist (with a forgetting la-
tency of 200); and looking at the turn-initial offers
(i.e. considering only the first offer of any given
turn) and the ratio of successful offers over offers,
the novices resemble the ignorant cautious (or the
very similar ignorant optimistic) agent.
Thus, although novice players make very many
trade offers, they are at the lower end of the spec-
trum when it comes to making successful offers,
which in turn limits the number of trades they
make. Note that the high number of trade offers is
not simply a result of adopting a negotiation strat-
egy of making partial offers (which, by definition,
require at least one other offer to complete it): the
high number of turn-initial offers shows that the
number of game turns in which people try to trade
is at the upper end of the spectrum.
These results are consistent with our previous
explanations. People don’t have a perfect memory
(and for novice players, who have to keep track of
many unfamiliar aspects of the game, this seems
even more true). So they forget information. On
the other hand they make many more attempts to
trade, which is consistent with our suggestion that
one strategy to compensate for an imperfect mem-
ory (up to a point) is to negotiate more.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Strategic conversation, where the agents’ goals
diverge, is typically modelled as a game with
a known analytic solution, where standard algo-
rithms for identifying optimal actions apply. But
human behaviour often diverges from game theo-
retic solutions and furthermore such models do not
apply to noncooperative dialogues in the context
of a complex game like Settlers that lacks any ana-
lytic solution. We, therefore, presented an alterna-
tive approach—an empirical framework in which
on can evaluate how distinct dialogue strategies
fare in the fact of distinct belief and memory mod-
els, including models that exhibit human-like er-
rors like forgetting.
We first established that the existing JSettlers
trading strategy correlates with winning. We then
experimented with various models of the means
for achieving such trades, and compared these
models with the behaviour exhibited in a corpus
of people playing Settlers.
Our agents varied on the extent to which they
have accurate beliefs about hidden aspects of the
game state, and the extent to which they can re-
member evidence for those hidden values. Agents
with limited accuracy in their beliefs have three
coping strategies for handling missing evidence:
being optimistic and always assuming that the de-
sired offer will have the desired outcome; being
cautious (e.g., the original JSettlers agent) by us-
ing the available evidence to estimate hidden val-
ues but defaulting to favourable hidden values
when evidence is inconclusive; and being pes-
simistic by assuming unfavourable values when
evidence is inconclusive.
Belief and memory models affect the number
and the quality of trade offers that agents make. An
agent with perfect knowledge of the other agents’
resources and a non-optimistic negotiation strat-
egy makes offers that are much more likely to re-
sult in trades, but he fails to outperform his oppo-
nents’ win rate, even though the opponents’ belief
models are more fallible. We speculate that this is
because the opponents are more likely to enter into
a negotiation (given that they default to assuming
it will have the desired effect), and so increases the
likelihood that they make an advantageous trade,
if not the initially desired trade. Thus some igno-
rance can be bliss!
Indeed, being completely ignorant can be com-
pensated for by being optimistic. This results in
a much less efficient negotiator but more trades
overall. On the other hand, capping the number
of offers inhibits the advantages of this strategy.
We can draw similar lessons from the forgetting
agents, which show that (all else being equal) be-
ing able to remember more about your opponents’
resources increases your chances to win. Or just
be more optimistic (and less efficient).
We also took our first steps towards compar-
ing our computational negotiation models with the
strategies deployed by people playing Settlers. We
showed that the predominant way of making par-
tial offers observed in the human corpus does not
change the win rate of our existing agents, and
the observed changes in the number of offers and
successful trade offers are consistent with our ac-
count. We also showed that while none of our
agents directly models human performance, their
performance is comparable in many ways. Of our
agents, the ignorant optimistic agent is closest to
the novice human performance exhibited in the
corpus. In future work we will create cognitively
more plausible agents and evaluate them by letting
them play against humans.
While it was necessary for all agents to use the
same build strategy (except for the random agent)
so as to reduce the number of variables in our
simulations, this is clearly an oversimplification in
that the agents enjoy almost perfect predictions of
their opponents’ build plans.
In future work, we will explore the relative mer-
its of revealing vs. concealing information about
intentions when the agents all deploy distinct build
strategies. We will also enhance the negotiation
strategies by allowing agents to initiate a negoti-
ation for a ‘second best’ trade when they believe
their best trade won’t have the desired effects, and
we will investigate the benefits and costs of decep-
tion in a trade negotiation.
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